Schools in England and Wales since the late 1980s have been compared in terms of their performances in public examinations and standardised test scores in the form of 'school league tables', with Wales ceasing to produce these after 2001. One of the factors related to performance in examinations is the choice of the examination board, with five main boards currently active in England and Wales. In this paper, we study differences in student uptake and performance among boards and how this has changed over time. By contrasting the experiences of England and Wales the results of our analyses provide a commentary on recent attempts to understand the effects of league tables on school performance. 
Introduction
There is a continuing debate, in the UK and elsewhere, about whether school league tables based upon standardised test scores and examination results, despite their well-known negative side effects, actually improve the performance of pupils by 'holding schools to account' and by facilitating 'the market in education' via informing choice of schools.
The use of value-added scores, based upon analyses that incorporate measures on individual students, is generally regarded as the soundest basis for appropriate school comparisons since they (attempt to) adjust for selection effects that lead to schools differing in the initial achievements of their students. Nevertheless, Leckie and Goldstein (2009 , 2011a , 2011b argue that the uncertainty surrounding value-added scores for schools is so large that most schools cannot reliably be separated for the purposes of accountability.
Furthermore, they conclude that such scores are of little use for parents choosing schools for their children, where they need to predict school performance many years ahead given past data.
One of the more recent analyses that claims that public league tables do in fact raise pupil performance, by holding them to account, is by Burgess et al. (2013) . These authors compare the year 11 (modal age 16 years) General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) public examination scores of students over time in Wales, where league tables were dropped in 2001, and England which continued to publish them. The authors argue that the abolition of league tables in Wales worsened the performance of Welsh students relative to their English peers and conclude that "If uniform national test results exist, publishing these in a locally comparative format appears to be an extremely cost-effective policy for raising attainment and reducing inequalities in attainment."
In this paper, we first discuss the Burgess et al. findings and examine the assumptions that are made. We then present a new analysis that addresses the same country comparison, using a methodology based upon comparing student performances across different examination boards over time.
Trends across time in England and Wales
Essentially, Burgess et al. compare 
the difference in GCSE results between England and
Wales over the period 2002 -2008 and show that this difference increases steadily over time.
This compares with the period before 2002 when there were no differential trends over time.
Wales in 2001 for this trend, testing various assumptions and using a series of carefully constructed statistical models. Nonetheless, they conclude that it is indeed the abolition of the league tables that has placed Wales at an increasing disadvantage compared to England.
One limitation of these authors' analyses is that they only had data at the school level and any relationships at that level may not reflect those that pertain to relationships of interest which are at the student level. This is often referred to as the 'ecological fallacy' (Robinson, 1950) . A second limitation is that they were only able to perform rough approximations to full value-added analyses by using (school average) test score data at key stage 3 (KS3, year 9, modal age 14) when students had already been at secondary school for three years rather than the key stage 2 (KS2, year 6, modal age 11) data based on tests just before starting secondary school. Thus, their analyses only allow for a partial adjustment for secondary school selection mechanisms, restricting their ability to draw causal conclusions. A strength of our analysis below is that we have access to both data at the student level and that we can link these data to students' KS2 scores.
A more general concern with studies of this kind, referred to as 'difference-indifferences' studies within economics, is that attempts to infer causation from correlated trends are open to criticism because so many other things also change over the study period and one can never be sure that these alternative explanations have been completely ruled out.
Another issue, and the focus of this paper, concerns the substantial differential use of examination boards across the two countries. In Wales most students sit the Welsh Joint Examination Council (WJEC) exams whereas in England only a minority do. A basic requirement when public examination scores are used for comparisons is that there is an equivalence of marking and grading standards across different boards, or at least in this case that any differences are constant over time. Yet this is a problematic assumption. When the league tables and associated KS2 and KS3 testing were abolished in Wales, there was no longer any satisfactory way that such common tests could be used to establish and monitor exam standards in Wales in relation to England. There is therefore a concern that comparability may have changed over time. For example, the relative Welsh decline in exam results might potentially be explained by a relative hardening of the WJEC examination difficulty relative to that of the English exam boards. Burgess et al. merely state, without providing evidence, that: "The National Qualifications Framework ensured that qualifications attained by pupils across the countries were comparable during this period". One of the ways in which the authors could have put this comparability assumption to the test, albeit weakly, while simultaneously going some way to evaluating the robustness of their 'causal' finding, 7-Jan-16 4 would have been to divide England into its regions and study comparative trends in each of these, in order to see if in fact Wales really was behaving differently to all other regions. If similar variations in trends were to be found among English regions it would then seem less plausible that the Welsh results could be ascribed to changes in either league table or testing policy.
The major omission in the paper, however, is that the authors fail to mention that, by stopping KS2 and KS3 testing at the same time as abolishing league tables, Welsh students became less exposed to high-stakes tests, and were therefore arguably less well-equipped for the GCSE examinations too. This, admittedly, is somewhat speculative, but we do know that the ability to do well on tests is strongly related to the amount of practice that pupils have been given (see for example, Rogers and Yang, 1996) , and it would be somewhat surprising if this did not also extend to public examinations. Interestingly, when piloting for the reintroduction of regular testing in Wales took place in 2012, there was evidence (Hodgson, 2013 ) that the performance of pupils had deteriorated as a result of not being tested intensively during their schooling. So here we have a plausible mechanism that is capable of explaining the relative Welsh decline in exam results. In other words it may have little if anything to do with non-publication of league tables, but simply to the lack of test practice.
We cannot, with the data available, hope to resolve the 'causality' issue, but we can explore further the problem of comparability between examination boards and the remainder of this paper sets out to do that. In the next section we study overall trends in uptake and performance in each country and by exam board. We then look at trends in value-added exam performance, where we fit multilevel statistical models to adjust students' GCSE scores for Figure 1 show the numbers of pupils involved by examination board and year together with mean grade scores. Apart from the overall increase in mean scores, one trend that stands out from this table is the rapid increase in the numbers of students in England taking the WJEC examination, whereas the three other exam boards lose numbers. It is not clear why this increase occurred, but possibly it was because in schools that had not entered students for WJEC examinations previously, WJEC was increasingly perceived to be easier over our period, and that this also encouraged schools to enter lower achieving students for WJEC examinations. We shall later consider the subset of schools who have at least one WJEC candidate in every year they appear in the data (some schools opened and closed during the period). For these 'WJEC schools', the overall numbers remain stable and their overall mean scores are similar to the remainder. The other trend is the fall in performance of the WJEC students in Wales compared to those in England (including WJEC students in England). This is consistent with the findings of Burgess et al. for 2004 Burgess et al. for -2008 , although they looked at mean GCSE score over all subjects, not just English. We explore this issue below in our more detailed multilevel analysis. Table 2 shows a series of three-level random-intercept models where the response is student GCSE grade score and predictors are year (centered on 2007 and treated as a continuous variable), whether or not the exam board was WJEC, and the student's average KS2 test score (across English and mathematics), plus selected interaction terms. There are differences among the three English exam boards, but for simplicity we group these in each 7-Jan-16 6 model in order to focus on the overall differences between these and the WJEC board. The three-level structure of the models take into account the nesting of students (level-1) within schools (level-2) within local authorities (level-3). It is important to account for such clustering in statistical models as failure to do so will typically lead to spuriously precise regression coefficients and thus incorrect inferences. One might reasonably extend these models to respect the ordinal nature of the response, to include school-by-cohort random effects, and to include random school-level coefficients, but for simplicity we do not consider such extensions here (Goldstein, 2011) . Model B extends this analysis by adjusting for student KS2 score so that the remaining coefficients are to be interpreted in terms of student progress during secondary school -a value-added analysis. The gap in 2007 between WJEC and other students is now smaller reflecting the lower KS2 achievement of the WJEC students. The exam board attainment gap, however, shows a similar rate of narrowing over time as before (0.049): over the four year period, the difference between WJEC and remaining students decreases somewhat by 0.196 (= 4*0.049) grade score points. We see, in the interaction term with KS2, a greater coefficient for KS2 among the WJEC so that the GCSE attainment gap between WJEC and non-WJEC students narrows with higher performance on KS2. Thus, the WJEC student mean performance for students at the lower 10 th percentile on KS2 score (-5.920) is -0.720 (= -0.347 + 0.063*-5.920) that is, over two thirds of a grade score behind whilst for those at the 90 th percentile on KS2 score (5.620) it is -0.007 (= -0.347 + 0.063*5.620) that is effectively the same as the non-WJEC student mean performance.
In Models C and D we have included terms that distinguish 'WJEC schools', which entered at least one WJEC student in every year that they appear in the data, from 'non-WJEC schools' which did not. In Model C, we see that there is a non-significant effect for decrease of 2.6 grade scores in Welsh WJEC students' grades over the period (Table 1) , this reinforces the inference of a real decline in scores for Welsh students.
It is of interest to look at the exam board entry policies of schools, especially for whether there are selection effects. Table 3 presents the results of Models E and F which looks at the relationship between KS2 score and school exam entry policy. In Model E, we see that overall there is a lower average KS2 in the WJEC schools (-0.300). When, however, in
Model F we actually look at those students who take the WJEC exams, we see only a small and non-significant interaction between taking WJEC and being in a WJEC school (-0.088),
and that it is the students who take the WJEC board examination who really have the lower KS2 scores. The non-WJEC students in WJEC schools actually have higher KS2 scores (-0.291 = -0.592 + 0.301) than the non WJEC students in non-WJEC schools (-0.592). Thus, this suggests that the WJEC schools have a lower achieving intake and are entering 'lower achieving' students for WJEC than for other exam boards at GCSE.
In summary, therefore, it would seem that any change in comparability of grading standards between WJEC and other boards is not a major explanation for the finding of decreasing performance of pupils in Wales.
Conclusions
Our conclusion from these analyses is that there does appear to be a real decline in Welsh pupil test scores over 2007-2011 following both the abolition of regular testing in schools and abolition of school league tables. Attribution of any causal effects is not possible given the data available and, in particular, the inference that the abolition of league tables per se is responsible seems unjustified. It seems more reasonable to suppose that a lack of test practice ('test-wiseness', Rogers and Yang, 1996) is a major contributing factor. This is reinforced by a study carried out in 2012 which also showed that Welsh pupils who had not been exposed to regular standardised tests tended, for example, to lack even the ability to navigate successfully through test booklets (Hodgson, 2013) . What we have sought to do in the present paper is to investigate a third possibility, that the issue of exam board comparability could be a major explanation for the observed effect. Our analyses suggest that this is not so.
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